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1 
STATISTICAL INEQUALITY AND INTENTIONAL (NOT IMPLICIT) 
DISCRIMINATION 
Michael Selmi
1
I  
INTRODUCTION 
This equality business has proven difficult. Since the passage of the Civil Rights Acts in 
the 1960s, our nation has made undeniable progress toward racial equality, but it is equally 
undeniable that this progress has been more limited than what civil rights advocates had 
envisioned. Schools remain deeply segregated by race, with large achievement gaps persisting.
2
Segregation also remains the predominant motif in housing—so much so that the push for 
integrated housing has largely been all but lost.
3
 In the workplace, African-American males
continue to have an unemployment rate twice that of white males, and this has been true for 
decades and at every educational level.
4
 Relatedly, there is a substantial wage gap again
regardless of the educational level of the workers.
5
 It has also been well documented that African
Americans are overrepresented in prison
6
 and in school discipline,
7
 and have significantly less
wealth accumulation than whites.
8
1
 Samuel Tyler Research Professor, George Washington University Law School. An earlier version of this paper was 
presented at a Conference on the Future of Civil Rights held at Duke Law School in November 2015. I am grateful 
for the comments I received at that time, as well as for the helpful comments from Mario Barnes and Pat Shin. 
Paulina Starotska provided helpful research assistance.  
2
  For a recent analysis of school segregation, see Richard Rothstein, For Public Schools, Segregation Then, 
Segregation Since: Education and the Unfinished March, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Aug. 27, 2013), 
www.epi.org/files/2014/Unfinished-March-School-Segregation.pdf. 
3
 Although progress has been made on residential segregation in many jurisdictions, the progress has generally been 
relatively limited by most conventional measures. See, e.g., PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN 
NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 9 (2013) (“Despite the high hopes of the 
civil rights era, the finding that emerges very clearly is that the stark racial inequality in America’s neighborhoods 
that existed in the 1970s has been pass on, with little change, to the current generation.”); John R. Logan, Separate 
& Unequal: The Neighborhood Gap for Blacks, Hispanics & Asians in Metropolitan America, US2010 PROJECT 
(July 2011), www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Data/Report/report0727.pdf (noting that, on average, black and Hispanic 
households live in neighborhoods with one-and-a-half the poverty rate of predominately white neighborhoods).     
4
 See Drew Desilver, Black Unemployment Rate is Consistently Twice that of Whites, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 21, 
2013), http://pewrsr.ch/13FFoUo (documenting historical unemployment gap dating to 1954).  Unemployment 
rates vary by educational levels with individuals at the lowest educational levels having the highest unemployment. 
But no matter the level, African Americans are unemployed at twice the rate whites. In 2011, blacks with less than a 
high school degree had 31.7% unemployment rate and whites had 18.1%. For those with advanced degrees, the rates 
were 5.8% for blacks and 3.0% for whites. See LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 341 
(12th ed. 2012). 
5
 Even those African Americans with advanced degrees make less than whites who have obtained the same level of 
education. See Median Weekly Earnings By Education Attainment in 2014, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Jan. 23, 2015), 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2015/median-weekly-earnings-by-education-gender-race-and-ethnicity-in-2014.htm.  
6
 Based on the latest statistics on inmates in state and federal—but not local—prisons, African Americans are 
imprisoned at a rate that is six times higher than that for whites, with black males incarcerated at a rate that is nine 
times higher than the rate for white males. See Ann E. Carson, Prisoners in 2013, U.S. DEP’T JUST., BUREAU JUST. 
STAT. 3 (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf. Thirty-six percent of the 1.5 million 
prisoners were African Americans. Although this has been a long-standing issue, Professor Michelle Alexander has 
brought heightened attention to the issue.  . See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
2 
 
 These statistics are likely to produce one of three responses, what I will refer to as (1) 
“Yes but . . . ,”  (2) “Racism is everywhere,” and (3) “Tell me more.” Those in the “yes but” 
category are discrimination skeptics who resist concluding that discrimination underlies the 
observed inequities and they seek alternative explanations. Those in the second group see 
discrimination everywhere there are disparities and may go so far as to cast racial aspersions on 
those in the first group. The third group wants to know more about the inequities, wants to know 
more about why wage gaps persist even at the highest levels, or why affluent African Americans 
tend to live in neighborhoods that are less affluent than their white cohorts.
9
 To be sure, some of 
those who initially may want more information, those who start of by saying “tell me more” will 
turn out to be skeptics as there will be no additional information that will convince them that the 
inequities are the product of discrimination.  
 
This essay examines how we can reach agreement and come to a mutual understanding 
about when discrimination is responsible for the many inequalities that persist in society. This is 
a critical question because in the United States, as a matter of policy, we are committed to 
remedying discrimination, not inequality.  In other words, we will only address racial inequality 
that is the product of discrimination.
10
  As a result, it is important to have a broad and consensual 
definition of discrimination.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS, 2 (2012) (asserting that our criminal justice system has 
disenfranchised a disproportionate percentage of the black population).    
7
 Inequities in school discipline will be discussed in the next section, but a recent government study found that, 
whereas African Americans comprise 16% of the public-school population, they account for 33% of out-of-school 
suspensions and 34% of expulsions. See Data Snapshot: School Discipline, U. S. DEP’T EDUC. OFF. CIV. RTS. 2 
(Mar. 2014), www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/crdc-discipline-snapshot.pdf. 
Based on 2013 data, whites have average net worth that is thirteen times larger than African Americans, which  is 
the highest measured disparity since 1989.  See Rakesh Kochar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened 
Along Racial Ethnic Lines Since End of Great Recession (2014),  available at www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession.
9
 This has long been true and was reaffirmed by 2010 Census 
data. See JOHN R. LOGAN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: THE NEIGHBORHOOD GAP FOR BLACKS, HISPANICS & ASIANS 
IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 1 (2011), www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Data/Report/report0727.pdf (“With one 
exception (the most Affluent Asians) minorities at every income level live in poorer neighborhoods than do whites 
with comparable incomes.”).  
9
 This has long been true and was reaffirmed by 2010 Census data. See JOHN R. LOGAN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: 
THE NEIGHBORHOOD GAP FOR BLACKS, HISPANICS & ASIANS IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 1 (2011), 
www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Data/Report/report0727.pdf (“With one exception (the most Affluent Asians) minorities 
at every income level live in poorer neighborhoods than do whites with comparable incomes.”).  
10
  Affirmative action might appear to provide a contrary example, but that is not necessarily so.  From its inception, 
affirmative action  has been a deeply contested policy  and it has always been used as a modest tool of remediation.  
Affirmative action has taken hold only in higher education, an important but limited institution, at least in terms of 
addressing inequality. The courts, in fact, have squelched affirmative action in the housing context.  See, e.g., See 
United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1103 (2d Cir. 1988) (invalidating quota program for public 
housing that was designed to integrate the housing).  As to school desegregation, busing and racial redistricting 
might be seen as adjuncts of affirmative action, but both of those initiatives were designed to remedy discrimination, 
rather than the underlying inequalities, and both receded once it appeared that discrimination had run its course.  In 
the context of busing, three short years after approving as busing as a remedy to desegregate schools, the Supreme 
Court prohibited busing that sought to cross school district boundaries, severely limiting busing’s remedial force. 
Compare Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (approving busing as a remedial option 
to desegregate schools) with Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (invalidating busing plan that sought to 
include the Detroit suburbs). In the voting rights context, the Supreme Court was hostile to racial redistricting from 
the outset. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (applying strict scrutiny to and rejecting North Carolina’s 
redistricting plan). 
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This essay is concerned with racial equality and will focus on two areas in which the data 
are strikingly clear but the causal links between inequality and discrimination are often 
contested. The first area is school discipline, especially suspension and expulsion, which has had 
a longstanding, well-documented, and disproportionate effect on African Americans, particularly 
African American boys.
11
 The data are clear that African Americans are far more likely to be 
suspended or expelled than white students, with similar results for expulsions.
12
 The second area 
I will analyze is racial profiling— with a particular focus on automobile stops, or what is 
colloquially known as “driving while black.”  Much as is true with school discipline, the data on 
automobile stops are indisputable; African Americans—and to a lesser extent Latinos—are far 
more likely to be stopped than are whites, even though white drivers are more likely to be found 
in possession of contraband.
13
 Yet in both of these areas, there is strong resistance by responsible 
policymakers to attributing these inequities to discrimination, particularly in the context of police 
stops where every possible alternative explanation is often explored and asserted.
14
 I have 
decided to focus on these two areas because the relevant data are compelling, and yet the 
public’s desire to avoid a finding of discrimination often appears to be equally strong.  
 
The third part of this essay discusses the high standards imputed to statistical inequities as 
proof of discrimination and the many ways in which discrimination skeptics and others seek to 
avoid concluding that statistical disparities are a product of discrimination. This essay also 
suggests, contrary to current trends in scholarship, that the move to define the disparities as 
“implicit bias” has hurt more than it has helped and the observed disparities should not be 
confused with implicit bias as repeated patterns of behavior will almost certainly have a 
conscious component to them 
15
 Finally, the last part of the essay will suggest the importance of 
ensuring accountability as the best way of reducing statistical disparities, regardless of whether 
we can obtain consensus on the underlying rationale for the disparities.  
 
II 
RACIAL INEQUITIES IN SCHOOL DISCIPLINE AND POLICE STOPS 
 
Racial inequities remain a persistent fact of social and economic life in the United States. 
Some of those inequities – many people place housing in this category – might be the product of 
class or even personal choices, and to the extent the observed inequities are the product of 
personal choices, it is often thought that there is little reason to intervene to address them.
16
 As 
                                                          
11
  See sec. II. A., infra.    
12
  Id. 
13
 The issue is discussed in section II.B., infra. 
14
 For a thorough critique of studies that document disparities in police stops see Greg Ridgeway & John McDonald, 
Methods for Assessing Racially Biased Policing, in RACE, ETHNICITY AND POLICING: NEW & ESSENTIAL READINGS, 
at 180-204 (S. Price & M. White 2010).  These critiques, which often focus on possible differences in driving 
behavior between studied groups, will be discussed further in section II, B., infra.        
15
 See section III, infra. 
16
 This sentiment is most pronounced in the school desegregation cases, including in the most recent Supreme Court 
case where the Court viewed the segregation of the schools as a product of housing choices.  See Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 713 (2007) (emphasizing that the segregated nature of the 
Seattle schools was a function of where students lived).  This view that private housing choices are beyond 
constitutional reach has a long pedigree in the school cases.  See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) 
(prohibiting multi-district remedy designed to address discrimination within Detroit School District).  For an 
analysis of the connection between the school cases and housing choices see Erika Frankenberg & Genevieve 
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has been well documented, ambiguity is often the death knell for efforts to address observed 
inequities.
17
 This part therefore avoids ambiguity by focusing on two areas in which the data are 
incontrovertible: school discipline and police stops. In these two areas, it is impossible to deny 
the existence of significant racial inequities, but attributing those inequities to discrimination 
turns out to be another matter entirely. 
 
A. School Discipline  
 
There is a tragic quality to the data on school discipline, and that is that African 
Americans have been subject to far more frequent and harsher discipline than have white 
students. It is difficult to know just how long this has been going on but the phenomenon has 
been documented going back to the 1970s when a Children’s Defense Fund report demonstrated 
that black students were two to three times more likely to be suspended compared to white 
students in various localities throughout the nation.
18
 Since that time, matters have actually 
worsened because suspensions and expulsions have sharply increased, and the harms of school 
exclusions have become clearer.
19
 
 
The racial inequities in the administration of school discipline are so well established that 
a court could likely take judicial notice of them.  In fact, it is difficult to find a jurisdiction in 
which African American students are not subject to greater discipline than white students. Recent 
data collected by the United States Department of Education indicate that black students are 
suspended and expelled at a rate that was three times higher than the rate for white students, and 
that, although blacks constitute 16% of the student population, they account for 32% of out-of-
school suspensions and 31% of student arrests.
20
 What is perhaps most alarming, is that the 
disparities begin as early as preschool, where African Americans account for 48% of out-of-
school suspensions despite being only 18% of the student population.
21
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Siegel-Hawley, Public Decisions and Private Choices: Reassessing the School-Housing Segregation Link in the 
Post Parents Involved Era, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397 (2013).   
17
  For a discussion of how discrimination often operates in ambiguous situations—where there is no clear decision, 
for example—see Adam R. Pearson, John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, The Nature of Contemporary 
Prejudice: Insights from Aversive Racism, 3 SOC. & PERSONALITY COMPASS 1, 5 (2009) (discussing ways aversive 
racism operates in ambiguous social norms).  
18
 See CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND, SCHOOL SUSPENSIONS: ARE THEY HELPING CHILDREN? 9 (1975) (“While the 
largest numbers of suspended children are white, proporationally suspensions hurt more children who are black, 
poor, older and male.”). 
19
 See, e.g., James Wallace et al., Racial, Ethnic and Gender Differences in School Discipline Among U.S. High 
School Students: 1991-2005, 59 NEGRO EDUC. REV. 47, 48. (2008) (documenting increase in suspensions). It has 
been well-documented that suspensions are connected with future involvement with the criminal justice system. See 
Anne Gregory, Russell J. Skiba & Pedro A. Noguera, The Achievement Gap and the Discipline Gap: Two Sides of 
the Same Coin?, 39 EDUC. RESEARCHER 59, 60 (2010) (“Research shows that frequent suspensions appear to 
significantly increase the risk of academic nonperformance.”).    
20
 See Data Snapshot: School Discipline, U. S. DEP’T EDUC. OFF. CIV. RTS. 2 (Mar. 2014), 
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/crdc-discipline-snapshot.pdf. 
21
 Id. Although African-American boys are subject to the most discipline, African-American girls are subject to far 
higher rates of discipline than are white girls. Id. 
5 
 
The University of California Los Angeles Civil Rights Project has also recently issued an 
extensive report on school discipline with similar findings.
22
 In particular, the study found that 
suspensions of African Americans more than doubled between 1972, when 11.8% of black 
students received a suspension, and 2010 when 24.3% of black students were suspended.
23
 
During the same time period, white students experienced only a modest increase in suspensions 
from 6% to 7.1% of students.
24
 Female black students had a suspension rate that was higher than 
the rate for males of all other races.
25
  
 
A recent study conducted by the Center for the Study of Race and Equity at the 
University of Pennsylvania analyzed data from school districts located in the South.
26
 In an 
astounding eighty-four of the 132 school districts analyzed, African Americans were 100% of the 
suspended students, and in all 132 school districts black students were suspended at a rate five 
times higher than the rate for the overall student population.
27
 The study also found that although 
suspensions decreased overall in Texas, the disproportionate impact of suspensions on African 
Americans increased.
28
  These studies –and there are many more –paint a consistent and coherent 
portrait of the school discipline process, one that severely disadvantages African-American 
students and has done so since at least the 1970s.
29
            
 
The data are irrefutable, but that does not end the debate or determine what the 
appropriate remedial response should be.  Suspensions tend to be viewed in a binary fashion: 
either they are justified by the behavior of the students, or they are discriminatory. This binary 
approach is particularly prominent among lawyers given that within a legal framework there are 
no ties, only a winner and loser—a justified suspension or a discriminatory suspension. But it 
might not be so simple, as we will see as we explore the various justifications that are typically 
asserted to defend the disparities.   
 Skeptics of the continuing prevalence of discrimination are almost certain to respond to 
the statistics by asserting that the disproportionate discipline is the result of disproportionately 
poor behavior among African American students. In other words, African- American youth are 
                                                          
22
  Daniel J. Losen & Tia Elena Martinez, Out of School and Off Track: The Overuse of Suspensions in American 
Middle and High Schools, CIV. RTS. PROJECT (Apr. 8, 2013), 
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/resources/projects/center-for-civil-rights-remedies/school-to-prison-folder/federal-
reports/out-of-school-and-off-track-the-overuse-of-suspensions-in-american-middle-and-high-schools.  
23
  Id. 
24
  Id.  
25
 Id.  One of the study’s interesting findings was that school districts varied widely in their use of suspensions, with 
some large school districts such as Philadelphia being labeled as having a low frequency while many school districts 
had extremely high rates of suspension.  Id.  
26
 EDWARD J. SMITH & SHAUN R. HARPER, DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF K-12 SCHOOL SUSPENSION AND 
EXPULSION ON BLACK STUDENTS IN SOUTHERN STATES 1 (2015), 
http://www.gse.upenn.edu/equity/sites/gse.upenn.edu.equity/files/publications/Smith_Harper_Report.pdf. 
27
 Id. 
28
 Id.   
29
 For additional studies see Russell K. Skiba et al., The Color of Discipline: Sources of Racial and Gender 
Disproportionality in School Punishment, IND. EDUC. POL’Y CTR. 3 (2000), 
www.Indiana.edu/~equity/docs/ColorOfDiscipline.pdf (summarizing findings of prior studies); Lyndsey Layton, 
Study Finds Racial Disparities in Texas Elementary Schools’ Disciplinary Steps, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2015, at 3 
(study by Texas Appleseed “shows that black students, especially boys, are suspended and expelled at 
disproportionately high rates and are labeled as troublemakers as early as pre-kindergarten.”).  
6 
 
suspended more because they engage more often in behavior that warrants suspension. There are 
at least three responses to this claim. First, it should not be assumed that the excessive level of 
suspensions is the result of excessively poor behavior. To assume as much is to dismiss the force 
of the data at least its implications. And this would lead to the second response, which is how do 
we, or could we, know that it is the behavior of the students that triggers the suspensions rather 
than the disparate application of the rules, which are almost invariably discretionary in nature.  
For example, a study of the Texas school system found that only three percent of disciplinary 
actions were issued for behavior for which state law mandated suspension or expulsion.
30
 Most 
suspensions arise from behavior that is subjective in nature, such as disruptive classroom activity 
or disrespectful behavior, that is not easy to document. It is also difficult to know how many 
children got away with similar behavior or how many children received lesser punishment 
(detention or warnings) for identical or similar behavior, rendering the data, at best, inconclusive.  
Third, a number of studies have disputed the differential-behavior theory. For example, 
researchers have found that many office referrals that ultimately lead to suspension are the result 
of students questioning established practices or teacher authority and that these students are 
disproportionately students of color.
31
 Consistent with this finding, African-American students 
are more likely to be disciplined for “defiance” and “noncompliance.”32 A recent study 
demonstrated that disruptive white children are often handled very differently than are disruptive 
black children –  white children are more commonly provided with medical treatment, such as 
drug therapy, whereas black children tend to be treated in a more punitive or criminal way.
33
 In 
other words, disruptive white children are likely to be seen as suffering from Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder, while similarly disruptive black students might be seen as bad or 
potentially criminal kids. Divergent judgments such as these are not innocent; rather, they 
represent differential treatment steeped in racial stereotypes. 
All of this is to suggest that, even if the behavior —or some of it—might warrant 
suspension, that is not to say that white children are not being treated differently or that  lesser 
forms of punishment might be more appropriate.  Seizing on suspension as an appropriate 
punishment is likely tied to perceptions that black children are troublemakers deserving of severe 
punishment rather than young children who need to be redirected in one form or another. Indeed, 
a recent study found that teachers and school administrators frequently treat African-American 
boys as if they are older and more responsible for their actions than is developmentally 
appropriate.
34
   
                                                          
30
 See TONY FABELO ET AL., BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES: A STATEWIDE STUDY OF HOW SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 
RELATES TO STUDENTS’ SUCCESS AND JUVENILE JUSTICE INVOLVEMENT 38 (2011) (“Less than 3 percent of 
violations were related to behavior for which state law mandates expulsion or removal.”).  
31
 Frances Varus & K.M. Cole, “I Didn’t Do Nothin”: The Discursive Construction of School Suspension, 34 URB. 
REV. 87, 91 (2002) (arguing that suspensions often occur as a result of a normalized discursive code that Anglo-
Americans have more access to).  
32
 See Anne Gregory & Rhona S. Weinstein, The Discipline Gap and African Americans: Defiance or Cooperation 
in the High School Classroom, 46 J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 455, 459 (2008) (noting high number of disciplinary infractions 
relating to defiance or challenging authority among African-American males). 
33
 See David M. Ramey, The Social Structure of Criminalized and Medicalized School Discipline, 88 SOC. EDUC. 
181, 194 (2015) (finding that school districts with large minority and poor student populations are more likely to 
implement “criminalized” disciplinary policies and that white children are more likely to get medical treatment). 1 
34
 Phillip Atiba Goff et al., The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing Black Children, 106 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 540 (2014)  (“Black boys can be misperceived as older than they actually are 
7 
 
 One of the key issues, here, is that the data that might convince a skeptic that the 
disciplinary system is being applied in a discriminatory way likely do not exist. There will likely 
be no data on overall behavior that would allow for comparison of the treatment of black and 
white students, and it would be infeasible to conduct a random experiment of children essentially 
“performing” in a disruptive manner to determine whether they are treated similarly or 
differently. The statistics will either be meaningful or not, but it will be difficult to convince 
anyone by accumulating additional information.  Researchers have sought to clear away some of 
the arguments by determining whether the disparities in discipline might be attributable to class 
rather than race, but after taking into account socioeconomic status, it is clear that race remains a 
significant predictor of discipline.
35
                 
 Even if it is the case that there is evidence that African-American boys misbehave at a 
higher rate than other students, the inquiry should not end there, because the question remains—
what might account for the higher rate of misbehavior among African-American boys.  One 
might attribute the higher rate to the nature of the students, but there is no neutral reason why 
one would choose that explanation over others. It may be that the misbehavior of black youth is 
in response to inequitable treatment in the classroom. A teacher may treat transgressions of black 
males more harshly than that of other students, and may also respond more harshly than to the 
transgressions of other students, ultimately leading to negative, reactive behavior by the 
reprimanded student. A student, for example, who is repeatedly told to “sit down and shut up”, or 
told that he will amount to nothing as occurs in some classrooms, may respond by what will be 
perceived as misbehaving or disrepect.
 36
 Other students who are told that they must work twice 
as hard—a common message to African-American youth—may rebel at what they properly 
perceive to be an unfair edict.        
 When assessing data, such as the disproportionate application of disciplinary standards, 
there is a tendency to see that application as something other than discriminatory, even by those 
who seek change in the system. Teachers, it is often asserted, are likely acting not from 
discriminatory animus but rather it is their subconscious biases — stereotypes— that produce the 
disparate results.
37
 This might be so but at the same time this is a circumstance that could just as 
easily be treated as a form of intentional discrimination.  Certainly, for the ultimate 
decisionmaker, typically the school principal, there is nothing subconscious about the pattern of 
discipline. The principal will see all of the students who are being suspended and will know 
whether there is a pattern of disparate results. She, like others, may assume that the behavior 
warrants suspension rather than taking the time to inquire about how others in the class might be 
behaving, or whether the disruptive behavior might be the result of unfair treatment at the hands 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and prematurely perceived as responsible for their actions during a developmental period where their peers receive 
the beneficial assumption of childlike innocence.”).  
35
 See Anne Gregory et al., The Achievement Gap and the Discipline Gap: Two Sides of the Same Coin, 39 EDUC. 
RESEARCHER, 59, 61 (“[T]he highly consistent finding that race/ethnicity remains a significant predictor of 
discipline even after statistically controlling for measures of family income suggests that student SES is not 
sufficient to explain the racial discipline gap.”).  
36
  Extensive observational research has demonstrated that African-American boys are often treated differently and 
hostilely within classrooms and that their behavior is shaped by that differential treatment. See, e.g., ANN ARNETT 
FERGUSON, BAD BOYS: PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE MAKING OF BLACK MASCULINITY 88 (2000) (“This apprehension of 
black boys as inherently different both in terms of character and of their place in the social order is a crucial factor in 
teacher disciplinary practices.”). 
37
  The concept of implicit bias is discussed more fully in section III.2. 
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of a teacher or school official. But it is hard to see why the principal’s decision to suspend 
African-American boys without delving further into the pattern of suspensions she observes 
should be labeled as unconscious bias rather than a form of intentional bias.   Her decision to 
move forward with suspensions without further inquiry is an intentional decision made against a 
background of clearly racial results.  Alternatively, it may be that the Principal wants to appear 
supportive towards her teachers rather than challenging their actions.  But it is again important to 
emphasize that choosing to support her teachers over her students is a conscious choice, one that 
may be putting loyalty ahead of rooting out discrimination.  That is neither a neutral nor an 
inevitable choice, and again, there is nothing necessarily unconscious or implicit about making 
such a choice.  It might be different if the Principal, or a Superintendent, reviewed the 
suspensions and determined they were justified, but to ignore the racial pattern of discipline is to 
choose some value, whatever it might be, over racial equality, and that is a choice that is made 
deliberately.            
B. Police Stops. 
 Another area where the data are incontrovertible but the conclusions are contested 
involves police stops. There are many kinds of police stops, but the two that have been most 
commonly subject to discrimination analysis involve automobile stops and stops on the street, 
the latter of which are also known as stop-and-frisks or Terry stops.
38
 These latter stops are more 
controversial, though the findings are often even more compelling than in the automobile 
context. For example, in a recent lawsuit over the City of New York’s stop-and-frisk policy, it 
was shown that more than 80% of all individuals who were stopped were African-American or 
Latino, in a city where African Americans and Latinos constituted 52% of the population.
39
 The 
city sought to justify its policy by noting that a similarly high percentage of criminal suspects 
were African-American or Latino
40
 an argument the district court thought was too broad because 
it lumped all African Americans and Latinos together with the very small group that actually 
engages in criminal activity.
41
 One of the more interesting findings from the case was a statistic 
put forth by the plaintiffs: only about six percent of the searches were inadequate based on the 
law; the remaining searches were consistent with the governing legal standards.
42
 Yet the sheer 
number of stops -- in the millions, based on the evidence presented at trial-- meant that even a 
six-percent error rate led to thousands of unlawful stops.  
 In any event, the justifications for street stops are different in nature from automobile 
stops, and the rest of this section focuses on automobile stops, where the evidence of 
discriminatory police action is difficult to refute. This is not a new issue as vehicle stops by law 
enforcement drew national attention in the late 1990s based on a series of studies and lawsuits 
challenging highway patrol stops in New Jersey and subsequently in other areas, including 
                                                          
38
 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
39
 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); for a thorough analysis of the case and the 
various evidence, see generally Arthur Garrison, NYPD Stop & Frisk, Perceptions of Criminals, Race and the 
Meaning of Terry v. Ohio: A Content Analysis of Floyd et al. v. City of New York, 15 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 66 
(2014). 
40
 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 561.   
41
 Id. 
42
 See John Cassidy, The Statistical Debate Behind the Stop-and-Frisk Verdict, NEW YORKER (Aug. 13, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/the-statistical-debate-behind-the-stop-and-frisk-verdict (“On this 
basis alone, he concluded that six per cent of the stops—about two hundred thousand of them—were ‘apparently 
unjustified.’”). 
9 
 
Illinois and Maryland.
43
 These studies all demonstrated that the police pulled over African-
American drivers in far greater proportions than their representation among drivers on the 
highways studied. At the time, many of the stops were part of a broader “war on drugs” and 
involved efforts to interdict drug traffickers who were using some of the main highways on the 
East Coast and elsewhere to move their products.
44
 But these stops had a quality similar to New 
York’s stop-and-frisk practices. Many officers seemed to be treating all African Americans, or 
only African Americans, as drug smugglers rather than the small cohort who were actually 
engaging in trafficking.  The attention brought to these cases spawned legislation in a number of 
states that required police officers to record their stops and the reason for those stops. In other 
jurisdictions, such as Los Angeles, similar data were compiled in the context of lawsuit 
settlements, and it is the more recent data to which I will now turn. 
 The recent studies all show similar results: African Americans, and often Latinos, are 
stopped more frequently than whites and much higher than their representation in the population, 
although contraband is found at a higher rate among whites who are stopped. A 2014 report of 
Missouri vehicle stops statewide indicated that African Americans were stopped at higher rates 
than were whites and were 1.7 times more likely to be searched than were whites, even though 
whites had a higher hit rate—26.9% of searches produced contraband—than did African 
Americans, with a hit rate of 21.4%. In reviewing the report, the state Attorney General noted—
in what seemed like a state of exasperation—that the racial disparities had increased since 2000 
when the data collection began.
45
 In analyzing similar data from Rhode Island, the ACLU noted 
that in many local jurisdictions racial disparities had increased since 2003, when the first study 
was conducted.
46
 
 The New York Times recently conducted an extensive analysis of police stops in 
Greensboro, North Carolina, where pursuant to North Carolina law, detailed data are kept 
regarding automobile stops. African Americans make up 39% of the population of Greensboro 
but accounted for 54% of those who were pulled over.
47
 Once pulled over, African Americans 
were searched at rates that were twice as high as the rate for whites, yet, just as was true in the 
Missouri study, contraband was found more frequently on whites.
48
   Among the various North 
Carolina agencies the newspaper studied, the State Highway Patrol performed the best in 
reducing disparities, although the numbers were not encouraging; African-American drivers 
were still 1.5 times more likely to be pulled over than white drivers.
49
 And in Durham, North 
                                                          
43
 The ACLU has been a leader in challenging racial profiling in automobile stops. For an early report, see David A. 
Harris, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling on Our Nation’s Highways, ACLU (June 1999), 
https://www.aclu.org/report/driving-while-black-racial-profiling-our-nations-highways.   
44
 The drug-related enforcement efforts of the 1990s produced a number of lawsuits, most of which were 
unsuccessful. Though, many settled. See generally, e.g., United States v. Duque-Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (D. 
Kan. 2004) (finding that statistics proved racial effect but not intent); Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (rejecting discrimination claims). For a discussion of the various issues in the early cases, see R. Richard 
Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing & the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 587 (2003).  
45
 See 2014 Vehicle Stops Executive Summary,  MO. ATT’Y GEN. (2014), https://ago.mo.gov/home/vehicle-stops-
report/2014-executive-summary.  
46
 See Data Shows Racial Profiling Increasing in Searches During Motor Vehicle Stops, ACLU (Dec. 15, 2014), 
http://riaclu.org/news/post/data-shows-racial-profiling-increasing-in-searches-during-motor-vehicle-sto. 
47
 See Sharon LaFranieve & Andrew W. Lehren, The Disproportionate Risks of Driving While Black, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 24, 2015, at A1.  
48
 Id. 
49
 Id. 
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Carolina, the authors of an extensive study found that, “[t]he average Durham officer stops three 
whites for every four Blacks but searches one white for every four Blacks.”50 
The New York Times reporters also reviewed data from seven other states with reporting 
requirements and all showed similar racial disparities.
51
 In none of the studied jurisdictions did 
whites and blacks have an equal likelihood of being stopped, and in all but one, whites were 
more likely to be found with contraband.
52
 Despite that higher hit rate, African-American drivers 
were still more likely to be cited or arrested.
53
 A statewide West Virginia study produced the 
same results: black drivers were 1.64 times more likely to be stopped by law enforcement 
officers and twice as likely to be searched, though there was a higher hit rate for white drivers.
54
 
Despite that higher hit rate, African-American drivers were more likely to be cited or arrested.
55
  
 Two recent studies found slightly different results but reached similar conclusions. A 
highly detailed analysis of stops by Kansas City Police officers found that there were no racial 
disparities when the focus was on clear violations of the law such as speeding, but when it came 
to investigative stops, African-American drivers had twice as high a probability of being 
stopped.
56
 A study of the Washington State Patrol found that, unlike in other jurisdictions, there 
were no racial disparities in the initial stops but that African Americans, Latinos, and Native 
Americans were subject to higher rates of searches and citations even though the hit rate was 
higher for whites.
57
        
 Despite the consistency of the findings, police departments are slow to acknowledge the 
role race may play in their stops. They typically offer one of several responses and often all of 
                                                          
50
 Frank R. Baumgartner, Derek A. Epp & Bayard Lovell, Police Searches of Black and White Motorists, UNC-
CHAPEL HILL, DEP’T POL. SCI. (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/TrafficStops/DrivingWhileBlack-
BaumgartnerLoveEpp-August2014.pdf. 
51
  Id Seven states were studied, all of which had extensive reporting requirements, so were particular jurisdictions 
and departments within those states. The jurisdictions were Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, 
North Carolina, and Rhode Island.   
52
 Id. 
53
 Criminal Justice Statistical Analysis Center, West Virginia Traffic Stop Study, DIVISION CRIM. JUST. SERVS. (Feb. 
2009), www.djcs.wv/gov/ORSP/SAC/Documents/WVSAC_Traffic_NewOverviewofStatewideFindings2009.pdf. 
West Virginia Traffic Stop Study, Criminal Justice Statistical Analysis Center, Division of Criminal Justice Servs., 
Feb. 2009, available at 
www.djcs.wv/gov/ORSP/SAC/Documents/WVSAC_Traffic_NewOverviewofStatewideFindings2009.pdf Id.
56
  See 
CHARLES EPPS & STEVEN MAYNARD MOODY, PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 
110–14 (2014) (“We have shown that investigatory stops are the stie of pervasive racially biased policing, whereas 
traffic-safety stops generally involve unbiased policing.”). 
Id.
56
  See CHARLES EPPS & STEVEN MAYNARD MOODY, PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND 
CITIZENSHIP 110–14 (2014) (“We have shown that investigatory stops are the stie of pervasive racially biased 
policing, whereas traffic-safety stops generally involve unbiased policing.”). 
56
  See CHARLES EPPS & STEVEN MAYNARD MOODY, PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND 
CITIZENSHIP 110–14 (2014) (“We have shown that investigatory stops are the stie of pervasive racially biased 
policing, whereas traffic-safety stops generally involve unbiased policing.”). 
57
  The results of the analysis, which analyzes the results of other studies, can be found in Task Force on Race and 
the Criminal Justice System, Preliminary Report on Race and Washington’s Criminal Justice System, Appendix A 
(A-11), Traffic Stops (2011), https://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-
law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/1101/87WLR001.pdf?sequence=1. Based on the studies, Native-American drivers had 
the highest disparity, as they were subject to search twice as often as whites. Black drivers had a 20% disparity and 
Latinos 10%. Id. at A-11.    
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them at the same time.
58
 Often, in contesting the racial disparities that are found in the data, 
police departments suggest that it is inappropriate to measure stops by resident population given 
that actual drivers might vary from the resident population.
59
 There are at least two problems 
with this argument. First, many of the studies look at driver population, rather than resident 
population, and the disparities remain.
60
 Second, this is a classic argument that the Supreme 
Court rejected in the context of a regression study approximately thirty years ago.
61
 It is not 
acceptable, the Court unanimously held, for defendants simply to assert some alternative 
explanation.
62
 Rather, they must provide some plausible reason to believe that the alternative 
might be true.
63
 In this case, that means demonstrating some reason why the driving population 
would differ from the resident population, and this is never done.  This also applies to another 
common explanation offered by defenders of the stops – driving patterns might differ based on 
race, but again, the defenders never provide any data to support the assertion.  Instead, while 
acknowledging the disparities, the departments resist the conclusion that discrimination plays a 
role in the police stops.
64
 
 Second, borrowing from the stop-and-frisk context, police departments frequently argue 
that they are stopping drivers in high-crime areas or areas where suspicious activity occurs.
65
 
This argument is relatively easy to rebut. If it were true, one would observe a higher hit rate of 
contraband among black drivers.
66
 Yet, the hit rates are invariably higher among white drivers, a 
                                                          
58
 For a discussion of the  of the various critiques see Ridgeway & McDonald, supra note 14;  Clayton Mosler & J. 
Mitchell Pickerell, Methodological Issues in Biased Policing Research With Applications to the Washington State 
Patrol, 35 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 770 (2012).        
59
  See Ridgeway & McDonald, supra note 14, at 186-87 (discussing how commuter driving patterns may differ 
from the commonly used population statistics). 
60
  For example, a study involving the New Jersey Turnpike and stops made by the State Police had actual 
observational data.  See John Lamerth, Revised Statistical Analysis of the Incidence of Police Stops and Arrests of 
Black Drivers/Travelers on the New Jersey Turnpike Betweens Exits or Interchanges from the Years 1988 Through 
1991, Temple University. Dept. of Psychology, 1994, http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/eops/faip/new-jersey-study-
report.pdf.  See also Geoffrey P. Alpert, Michael Smith & Roger G. Durham, Toward A Better Benchmark: 
Assessing the Utility of Not-At-Fault Traffic Crash Data in Racial Profiling Research, Univ. of South Carolina 
(2004),  ttp://scholarcommons.sc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=crim_facpub (using observational 
data in Miami-Dade county do determine driving patterns).     
61
 See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986). 
62
 Id. at 407.  
63
  In Bazemore, The Supreme Court criticized the defendants for failing to demonstrate that the variables they 
claimed should have been included in the regressions would have changed the analysis, noting that the defendants 
failed “to demonstrate that when these factors were properly organized and accounted for there was no significant 
disparaity between the salaries of blacks and whites.”  478 U.S. at 403 n.14.   
64
  For example, in responding to a study demonstrating disparities in police stops in Durham, North Carolina, the 
police department responded:  “We acknowledge that the numerical data that is being put forth as statistical 
evidence illustrates a numerical disparity, but it does not offer any evidence or answers as to why the disparity 
exists.”  Durham Police Department Response to theFade Coalition Policy Recommendations, Oct. 31, 2013, 
https://durhamnc.gov/DocumentCenter/Home/View/2153.    
65
   Evan Allen & Travis Anderson, Evans Defends Boston Police After ACLU Report on Racial Bias, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Oct. 8, 2014 (noting that the Police “Commissioner William Evans defended the department, and said that 
officers focused on high-crime areas and individuals with gang affiliations and criminal records.”). 
66
 Hit rates, or the percentage of successful searches, were once thought to be the key measure of racial bias. So long 
as the searches of African Americans were more frequently successful than searches of whites, the disparities in 
searches could be justified. See Nicola Persico & David A. Castleman, Punishment & Crime: Detecting Bias Using 
Statistical Evidence to Establish Intentional Discrimination in Racial Profiling Cases, 2005 U. CHI. L. F. 217, 222–
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fact that refutes the notion that the stops are related to criminal activity. And it makes sense that 
the hit rate is higher among white drivers because police stop so many fewer white drivers, likely 
only when they have a reasonable suspicion. The arbitrariness of police stops for African-
American drivers is thus confirmed by the lower hit rates. 
 Several studies have sought to explore some of the alternative explanations police 
departments raise. Probably the most sophisticated study was that conducted by Professor Ian 
Ayres of Yale Law School regarding the Los Angeles Police Department.
67
 The Los Angeles 
study focused on both automobile and in-person stops and again found that African Americans 
were more likely than whites to be stopped, ordered out of their cars, frisked and subjected to 
searches even though African Americans were 42.3% less likely to be found with a weapon than 
whites.
68
 African Americans were also 29% more likely to be arrested than whites, and Latinos 
were 32% more likely to be arrested.
69
 The study went on to determine that the stops were not an 
artifact of local crime rates, as the authors were able to control for various geographic and 
demographic factors.
70
 Despite the evidence, the Los Angeles Police Department immediately 
dismissed the Ayres study by claiming the data, which was from 2003-04, was old, ignoring the 
fact that at the time the report was written, it was the most recent data that had been released by 
the Department.
71
 Another study of the Los Angeles Police Department data reached the same 
conclusion as the Ayres study and noted further that African Americans were subjected to the 
most consensual searches among drivers of different races, even though the police found the 
least contraband through such searches.
72
          
III 
STATISTICS AND DISCRIMINATION 
 
Not all statistical disparities are the product of discrimination but some are, and central to 
achieving greater racial equality will be determining how we can tell the difference--how we 
know when an observed statistical disparity should be equated with discrimination? Or to frame 
the issue in the context of this essay, how do we know when racial disparities in school discipline 
or police stops should be treated as discrimination? It is important to highlight the phrase 
“treated as discrimination” because ultimately the question of what constitutes discrimination is a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
25 (discussing the importance of hit rates to assessing bias). However, once the studies demonstrated higher hit rates 
among whites, the emphasis on hit rates, at least among police departments, has disappeared. 
67
  Professor Ayres is the author of a number of important studies documenting discrimination in a variety of fields. 
See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender & Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 
817, 822 (1991) (documenting discriminatory pricing within car negotiations; Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A 
Market Test for Race Discrimination in the Bail Setting, 46 STAN. L. REV. 987, 1008 (1994) (documenting 
discrimination in setting bail).  His work was transformed into an important and influential book on discrimination. 
See generally IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? NON-TRADITIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER 
DISCRIMINATION (2001).  
68
 See Ian Ayres & Jonathan Borowski, A Study of Racially Disparate Outcomes in the Los Angeles Police 
Department, ACLU (Oct. 2008), islandia.law.yale.edu/ayres/Ayres%20LAPD%20Report.pdf. The study is 
summarized in Andrew Blankstein, Study Cites Disparities in LAPD Stops, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2008, at A1. 
69
  Blankstein, supra note  68, at A12.  
70
  Id. 
71
  Id. 
72
  See Megan Armentrout, Cops & Stops: Racial Profiling and A Preliminary Statistical Analysis of Los Angeles 
Police Dept. Traffic Stops and Searches, Cal. State Poly. Pomona (June 2007), 
http://www.public.asu.edu/~etcamach/AMSSI/reports/copsnstops.pdf.  
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legal and social question, a judgment in the case of statistical disparities that those disparities are 
likely the product of discrimination. 
 
A.  The Meaning of Statistical Disparities. 
 
There is no easy metric to define discrimination, but, ultimately, we have to determine 
how certain, or how confident, we must be, to conclude that the disparities are the result of 
discriminatory acts. In litigation, common statistical methods are used to determine the 
likelihood that the observed results were the product of chance or some other factor, such as 
discrimination.  Depending on the data, it is also possible to employ regression analysis to ferret 
out, or limit, alternative explanations for observed disparities.
73
 But the standards of proof are 
very high –  typically, within the social-science framework that governs statistical analysis, one 
would seek a 95% confidence level—equivalent to two standard deviations—before eliminating 
chance as a possible explanation for the disparities.
74
 This is a significantly higher standard than 
the common civil standard that requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence, which 
requires only that a plaintiff prove her case as more likely than not true.  Nevertheless, the 
confidence level is rarely the problem with establishing discrimination based on statistics. 
Rather, it is exceptionally difficult to rule out all other possible explanations, which is what 
discrimination skeptics generally require. For example, an infamous Supreme Court case failed 
to accept the findings of a study demonstrating racial disparities in the application of the death 
penalty even though the study controlled for more than three hundred factors because not every 
nondiscriminatory reason could be excluded.
75
   
 
To return to the earlier examples, the underlying question is how to determine whether 
African-American students are suspended as a result of discrimination? The observed disparities 
are only a starting point, but statistically significant disparities would support the assumption that 
the disparities are not the product of chance. But that would not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that racial discrimination is the proper explanation. Rather, the disparities could be 
the result of differential behavior; they might also arise from school districts that suspend high 
levels of students or from some other nondiscriminatory explanation. Even though studies have 
shown that African-American students are typically treated differently for their behavior than 
                                                          
73
  The statistical methods are now well accepted. For a discussion of the use of statistical methods in employment 
discrimination cases, where they are likely most prominent in legal cases, see DIANNE AVERY ET AL., EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 204–10 (8th ed. 2010). See 
generally Theodore Eisenberg, Empirical Methods and the Law, 95 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 665, 667 (2000).  
74
  Courts, in particular the Supreme Court, have borrowed the statistical methods beginning with an important 
footnote in a jury selection case. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 n.3 (1977) (discussing the importance 
of tests of statistical significance in analyzing statistical data). Courts continue to require a minimum of two standard 
deviations, or the equivalent of a 95% confidence level, as a measure of statistical significance adequate to require 
further inquiry. See Adams v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 231 F.3d 414, 424 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Two standard deviations 
is normally enough to show that it is extremely unlikely . . . that the disparity is due to chance.”).  
75
  The case is McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987): perhaps the most vivid illustration of how difficult it can 
be to persuade a discrimination skeptic. Nearly thirty years later, studies continue to demonstrate that African 
Americans who kill whites have a disproportionately high probability of receiving a death sentence. See John J. 
Donohue III, An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System Since 1973: Are There Unlawful 
Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 637, 647-48 (2014) (“Specifically minority 
defendants who commit capital-eligible murders of white victims are over five times as likely to receive a death 
sentence as minority defendants who commit capital-eligible murder of minority victims.”).  
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they would if they were white, it is easy to discount those studies when it comes to an actual 
school district, and it will often be difficult to have appropriate data on the school or district 
level. The data on police stops is more complete but still lacking as to those who are not stopped, 
and police departments can still offer up hypothetical explanations for the disparities that are 
difficult to refute solely based on data.
76
   
 
As previously noted, Supreme Court case law provides important but oft-ignored 
guidance for assessing statistical proof of discrimination. In particular, the case of Bazemore v. 
Friday requires parties challenging statistical analysis to refute that analysis based on the data 
rather than offering up alternative explanations.
77
 That case involved salary disparities between 
black and white agricultural extension agents.  The defendants suggested that some factors other 
than race might explain the disparities. For example, agents worked on different crops, and it was 
possible that agents working on certain more desirable crops (tobacco, as this was 1970s North 
Carolina) might have been paid more, or those working in certain counties might have likewise 
been paid more.
78
 The Supreme Court held, however, that a defendant cannot simply offer 
hypothetical alternatives but instead must demonstrate the validity of an alternative explanation 
by using empirical data.
79
 In other words offering alternatives unsupported by data is an 
impermissible legal strategy.  In the Bazemore case, that meant that the defendants had to 
establish that the pay differentials were, in fact, attributable to different crops or different county 
contributions.  In the police context, this would likewise mean that the police department would 
have to prove that the drivers in a particular area or jurisdiction differ from the resident 
population, or that the driving habits of African Americans differ from whites in a way that 
would lead to them being pulled over more frequently.           
 
If followed, this principle would eliminate at least one of the rationales that 
discrimination skeptics use to reject statistical findings. However, the principle is rarely 
followed, including by the Supreme Court itself. In a variety of contexts, such as in the recent 
massive class-action claim against Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court has expressed skepticism over 
statistical methods of proof.
80
 This suggests that it will be difficult to convince discrimination 
skeptics of the presence of discrimination purely through statistical analysis and that something 
                                                          
76
   Data on racial profiling have been subject to extensive analysis. For helpful discussions of the issues that arise 
and the difficulty of dispelling doubt, see generally Chet K.W. Pager, Lies, Damned Lies, Statistics and Racial 
Profiling, 13 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 515 (2004); Nicola Persico, Racial Profiling? Detecting Bias Using Statistical 
Evidence, 1 ANN. REV. ECON. 229 (2009).  
77
  Bazemore, 478 U.S. at  
78
  Id. at 394. It seems relevant to note that as a young attorney (in other words many years ago) at the Justice 
Department, I worked on the Bazemore case when it was on remand from the Supreme Court. 
79
  Id. 
80
  In the Wal-Mart case, the Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence by noting, “A regional pay 
disparity . . .may be attributable to only a small set of Wal-Mart stores and cannot by itself establish the uniform 
strore-by-store disparity upon which the plaintiffs’ theory of commonality depends.”  Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 
564 U.S. 338, 357 (2011).  Earlier in the opinion, the Court also expressed doubt about the likelihood of widespread 
discrimination despite the plaintiffs’ extensive statistical evidence:  “[L]eft to their own devices most managers in 
any corporation – and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination – would select sex-
neutralpreference-based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.”  Id. at 355.  I 
have previously written on the Court’s skeptical treatment of statistical proof of discrimination in the context of the 
Wal-Mart litigation. See  Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 
32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477 (2011).  For an additional case dismissing statistical proof of discrimination see 
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469 (1996) (rejecting statistical analysis in selective prosecution case)..  
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more will be needed. What “more” might help is difficult to know; surely by this point in our 
history, we should not be looking for a smoking gun or a confession.  But it also seems 
increasingly clear that further progress challenging statistical disparities through litigation is 
unlikely. Instead, as discussed below, convincing public and private actors of the need to address 
the statistical disparities is likely a more effective remedy.       
 
This is not to say that litigation will prove fruitless.  Class-action discrimination claims 
based primarily on statistical analyses remain a small but vital part of judicial dockets, 
particularly in federal courts, and the claims are often successful.
81
 With class actions, success 
often turns on having the class certified because settlements typically follow, but a number of 
successful cases have gone to judgment in the last few years.
82
 It seems likely that many of these  
cases proceeded before discrimination sympathizers, those who want to know more as discussed 
earlier, but it is also the case that litigation remains a viable, if limited, means of bringing 
redress.           
 
B. Discrimination is Intentional Not Implicit.  
 
 In the area of contemporary discrimination research, there has been a parallel 
development that has further complicated proving systemic discrimination. Within the legal and 
popular literature, there is a growing fascination with what is typically defined as “implicit bias,” 
bias that is often described as unconscious in nature in that the perpetrator is unaware of her own 
biases.
83
 The typical measuring stick for the presence of implicit bias is the Implicit Association 
Test (IAT), an online test developed more than a decade ago that requires individuals to make 
rapid judgments based on screen images.
84
 Since its inception, the IAT has documented implicit 
bias in individuals based on associating African Americans with more negative words, and these 
                                                          
81
  The law firm of Seyfarth & Shaw produces an annual report on workplace class actions, and recently noted that 
settlements for all such class actions “reached an all-time high of $2.48 billion” with $295 million attributable to 
employment discrimination settlements.  The employment discrimination settlements demonstrated a significant 
increase over recent prior years.  See 12
th
 Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report, pp. 1-7 (2016), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/458698/employment+litigation+tribunals/Its+Here+Seyfarths+2016+Workp
lace+Class+Action+Report.  A recent study of class action certifications also noted that even after the Wal-Mart 
decision, many class action cases continued to be certified.  See Michael Selmi & Sylvia Tsakos, Employment 
Discrimination Class Actions After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 48 AKRON L. REV. 803 (2015) (analyzing class action 
decisions after Wal-Mart and concluding that there was not a significant decrease in certifications).   
82
  In a contentious and long-running litigation involving the New York Fire Department and its use of written 
examinations , the Second Circuit upheld a lower court’s determination of liability based on disparate impact theory 
but not disparate treatment.  See United States v. City of New York, 717 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2013).  A gender 
discrimination lawsuit against Novartis Pharmaceuticals resulted in a trial verdict of more than $250 million, and the 
case was later settled for $175 million.  See Velez v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125945 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).  The Supreme Court also recently held that the disparate impact theory was available for claims 
filed under the Fair Housing Act, a decision that is likely to spawn substantial housing-related litigation.  See Texas 
Dept. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 2507 (2015)..          
83
  The list is long, but, for a sampling of recent scholarship that emphasizes the role of implicit bias in contemporary 
discrimination, see generally Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment 
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997 (2006); Cynthia Lee, Making 
Race Salient: Trayvon Martin & Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555 (2013); L. 
Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143 (2012). 
84
 For an early discussion of the IAT see Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit 
Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1465 (1998)The test is 
available at Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/    
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findings have been relied on to indicate that many people might engage in discriminatory acts 
without even being aware of their own discriminatory impulses.
85
 It is often asserted that this 
kind of implicit bias, in which an individual actor may not intend to act in discriminatory ways, 
underlies much of contemporary discrimination.
86
 It is now common for racial profiling and 
school discipline—and many other statistical inequalities—to be described as products of 
implicit bias.
87
   
 
The problem with the obsession with implicit bias is that implicit bias is a concept 
defined mainly by what it is not: it is not explicit. That definition, however, is not particularly 
helpful when one is trying to understand the underlying basis for repeated statistical disparities. 
If we think of explicit bias as equivalent to what is sometimes referred to as overt bias – the kind 
of bias that is present in signs such as “No Blacks Allowed” – nearly all of contemporary 
discrimination will be seen as implicit, which might be then seen as —unconscious or non-
intentional, and in many ways less blameworthy because implicit bias is often defined as 
automatic in nature.
88
 Within the literature, particularly the legal literature, this analysis involves 
a two-step mistake, and both of the mistakes make it more difficult to address contemporary 
discrimination. 
 
The first mistake is to treat implicit bias as beyond one’s control. This is a distinctive 
feature of the IAT, which is designed as a rapid-response test so that, almost by definition, it is 
difficult to control one’s responses.89 But very few meaningful actions are the product of snap 
judgments, and this would include school suspensions and police stops or searches, and we could 
add to the list, employment decisions, sentencing and the like.  Those who advocate the use of 
the IAT as a measure of discrimination often point to experimental studies that demonstrate 
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limited, but meaningful, correlations between IAT scores and behavior.
90
 But what the advocates 
overlook is the extensive literature on the ability to control implicit bias.  
 
Studies have repeatedly demonstrated that various interventions can limit the activation 
of implicit or unconscious bias. For example, individuals primed with counter stereotypical 
examples demonstrate less bias in their IAT scores, and the decrease in bias lasts for an extended 
period of time.
91
 Broader research on bias across a wide area, not restricted to the IAT, 
consistently demonstrates the efficacy of a review process.
92
 When individuals know their 
actions will be reviewed, they are far less likely to allow their discriminatory impulses to 
interfere with their actions.
93
 To offer one recent example, a study of baseball umpires found that 
umpires were more likely to provide a favorable strike zone to pitchers of the same race as the 
umpire, but the favoritism receded when the game was nationally televised, presumably because 
the strike zone would be more closely monitored by the national audience.
94
 In another sports 
study, the authors found that basketball referees reduced their bias in foul calls after an earlier 
study revealing racial bias received widespread public attention.
95
             
 
Studies have also shown that those who are motivated to control implicit bias can often 
do so.  Extensive research has shown that people can work to reduce prejudice in various ways: 
some may want to reduce only prejudice that is visible, while others will work to reduce 
prejudice even when discrimination is not apparent.
96
 The excellent work of Frank Dobbin and 
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his colleagues on workplace diversity has demonstrated that when management makes diversity 
a priority, in part by designating accountable officials, results will follow.
97
 In other words, even 
if it is true that most discrimination is now implicit in nature -- more on that in a moment -- it is 
not the case that it is likewise inevitable. There are many ways to control and reduce bias, 
implicit or otherwise. 
 
The second misstep in the implicit-bias assessment is related and implicates the 
indiscriminate use of the term. Once individuals have been made aware of the presence of 
implicit bias and they fail to make any efforts to control that bias, it is far less clear that the 
subsequent acts should be treated as involving implicit bias. This returns to the fact that 
individuals are capable of controlling – or attempting to control – their biases, and failing to do 
so can be a sign that something other than implicit bias is at work.  
 
Returning to police stops, accepting that the officer does not consciously pull the driver 
over because of his race—which is the implication of implicit bias—all of the interactions 
thereafter will be taken with a consciousness of the driver’s race. The police officer will also 
likely know that African-American drivers are disproportionately pulled over and less frequently 
found to have contraband than white drivers and every step thereafter is informed by that 
knowledge. The decision to search the car will not be made either as a snap judgment, as in the 
IAT, or without regard to the person’s race, but the officer will be conscious of the driver’s race 
and will make a deliberate decision to search the car. In other words, at least after the initial stop, 
there is nothing implicit about the officer’s actions—unless by implicit we mean the officer did 
not claim to be acting because of the driver’s race. But that would be a highly unusual definition 
of implicit, or of discrimination more broadly.  Proof of discrimination has never required a 
confession or even an acknowledgment by the person engaging in discriminatory behavior.    
 
The school principal is in the same position. She would observe that African Americans 
are overrepresented among the students who are suspended, and she would make the conscious 
decision to explore the basis for the suspension more thoroughly or to ignore that fact and 
proceed with the suspensions. Again, there is no reason to label her behavior as implicit and 
there is little to be gained by doing so. Surely, repeated behavior by governmental agencies and 
individuals, with layers of oversight, should be treated differently from an isolated incident by a 
single police officer or teacher, but the rush to the implicit bias explanation largely ignores the 
difference between aggregate and individual behavior. Contrary to the message of implicit bias, 
these are not the unconscious actions of good people who cannot help themselves; these are 
individuals who are, at a minimum, unconcerned about the racial implications of their actions.
98
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To take a rather mundane but illustrative example, suppose Person A bumps into Person 
B and offers the common apology, “Sorry, I did not mean to do that.” Person B would likely 
accept that explanation on the first and perhaps the second incidents but, after the third, fourth, or 
hundredth, she would likely reject the excuse and assume the person intended to bump into her, 
or at a minimum, was not paying attention or did not care. Even within the framework of implicit 
bias, at some point repeated behavior should no longer be defined as implicit in nature. There is 
no particular reason to assume differently about incidents in which the police, school 
administrators, employers, judges, or anyone else engages in repeated acts with strong racial 
implications especially fter they have been made aware of the possible force of implicit bias and 
the ability to control it.  
              
 There is, it would seem, a strategic desire to define behavior as implicit: individuals 
might be more motivated to acknowledge and change their behavior if it is seen as common and 
not racist in nature. As a strategic move, this may work with some well-intentioned people, but 
we have been waiting a long time for those individuals to alter their behavior.
99
 Emphasizing the 
strategic nature of the implicit bias discussion is important because there is a tendency to treat 
the various theories of discrimination as if they represent a thing rather than a theory. To say that 
someone’s behavior has been influenced by implicit bias means their actions have been 
influenced by stereotypical thinking of which the person may be unaware and of which they will 
almost certainly disclaim responsibility. Fair enough, but their behavior could just as easily be 
defined as discriminatory in nature without the need for a label. Implicit bias suggests that its 
opposite might be explicit bias, which could be equated with old-fashioned discrimination or 
racist attitudes. This would be reflected in the common mantra “that we now have racism without 
racists.”100 But the world of discrimination need not be seen in such a as binary fashion  – it does 
not have to be either implicit or explicit, it can run across a spectrum that might involve some 
conscious attitudes mixed with less conscious stereotypical thinking. If we are forced to rely on a 
binary approach to discrimination, we should think of lawful and unlawful. Within that legal 
schema, as I argued many years ago, an individual’s motive is irrelevant to establishing liability 
though it can be relevant as a matter of damages.
101
   
 
 Part of the problem with labeling troublesome behavior as implicit in nature is that soft-
pedaling the behavior allows people to escape without responsibility. Moreover, it likely conveys 
the impression that there is something different about implicit bias than other forms of 
discrimination. However, the message we want to send, particularly if we want to remedy the 
consequences of the underlying actions, is that implicit bias is just another form of 
discrimination, not better not worse but still discrimination.            
 
 This is not to suggest that implicit bias is not a real or important concept  – it is both, and 
has aided our understanding of contemporary discrimination. It has, however, been overstated in 
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recent analyses on racial bias. Implicit bias should not be equated with its counterpart explicit 
bias if explicit bias is overt and unambiguous, and inevitably leads to a finding of discrimination. 
That kind of discrimination on a broad scale has not existed for many years, and it is a mistake to  
define all remaining discrimination as implicit bias.   
 
 
 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
 It is certainly difficult to convert discrimination skeptics into individuals who see 
discrimination as remaining part of the national landscape. In many ways, the election of 
President Barack Obama has provided additional fuel for skeptics.
102
 The move to an emphasis 
on implicit bias has not had the salutary effect many might have expected, although it has 
certainly played a role in the decisions of some individuals and entities to address lingering racial 
disparities. Ultimately, whether the disparities are the product of implicit bias or something else 
should not be the determining factor for whether those disparities are addressed. Rather, what is 
necessary is ensuring that someone is accountable for those disparities, which need to be seen as 
problematic regardless of their origin. Any public-school official who looks at the suspension 
data should be troubled by those findings both because of the extreme disparities between 
suspension rates of African Americans and whites and the harm that students endure when 
excluded from public schools. The response to the disparities should not be that the students are 
getting what they deserve but that the disparate application of suspension must be addressed, a 
step a number of school districts are now taking.
103
      
 
 The same is true with police stops, a context in which it will take initiative by a police 
chief or mayor to address disparities. Regardless of whether one concludes that disparities are the 
product of discrimination, the disparities should be seen as highly problematic and as  
contributing to tension between law-enforcement officers and the communities they serve. Upon 
taking office, New York’s Mayor de Blasio quickly settled the litigation over the city’s “stop and 
frisk policy” and changed the policy to reduce the number of such searches.104  In light of the 
New York Times article, the Police Chief in Greensboro, North Carolina ordered his police 
officers to not stop cars for minor infractions, at least until the Department could better 
understand the underlying reasons for the racial disparities in their stops.
105
   Private companies 
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can, and should, take the same initiative without waiting for a determination that their workforce 
disparities are discriminatory. The persistent racial disparities that we observe in virtually all 
walks of social and economic life demand attention. Even if implicit bias is the proper 
explanation for the disparities, those disparities, that bias, is neither inevitable nor uncontrollable.                  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
racial/article,42d2dfc7-ed33 (quoting Police Chief stating, “We must make the necessary changes to ensure that the 
issues, created by the statistics and perceptions, are . . . addressed.”). 
